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Abstract
MoR-Trust is a purely decentralized peer-to-peer trust management system, targeted towards networks and
applications supporting transactions or collaborations of a quantitative nature. MoR-Trust is based on the
notion of expressing trust in terms of monetary units, thus directly coupling the trust estimates circulated
in the network with the values of the transactions taking place and their outcomes. We have validated our
design decisions and algorithms through simulation. The results indicate that our system converges towards
a small error in the trust estimates distributed throughout the network.
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1 Introduction
It is being progressively recognised that information systems and applications sup-
porting collaborative tasks and/or transactions, that are traditionally designed
based on centralized or client-server models, can also be based on the new, ma-
turing wave of “peer-to-peer” architectures (the motivation for this is discussed in
[6,5]). In this new domain, trust plays an even more important role as a foundation
for eﬀective collaboration and fair transactions. However studies of the behavior
patterns in these on-line communities reveal a high degree of selﬁsh and uncooper-
ative behavior, and make apparent the need for incentive mechanisms to be applied
to stimulate cooperation and fairness.
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A variety of incentive mechanisms have been proposed, with reputation or trust-
based mechanisms being identiﬁed as the most appropriate choice [4].
1.1 Distributed trust management
Trust is critical for any society to exist [1], as it inﬂuences many everyday interac-
tions; We ask people that we trust for information, and we collaborate with people
that we trust. According to [1], trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular
level of the subjective probability with which an agent will perform a particular
action, before such action can be monitored. Based on this deﬁnition of trust, an
entity’s reputation is some notion of its propensity to fulﬁl the trust placed in it; an
expectation about an entity’s behavior based on information about or observations
of its past behavior. Reputation is thus created through feedback from individuals
who have previously interacted with the entity.
The main goal of a trust management system, such as MoR-Trust, is to main-
tain and distribute trust information about the parties (peers) engaged in collab-
oration or transaction processes. This information is used to provide a reputation
measure, i.e. an expectation about another node’s behaviour in a transaction.
Online trust management systems can thus be described as large-scale “online
word-of-mouth communities” in which individuals share opinions about other indi-
viduals. Maintaining a high trust rating can be used as an incentive to reduce the
degree of selﬁsh or lavish behavior of peers, that is often observed.
Centralized trust or reputation management systems [21,14,13], such as the one
behind the popular eBay site, are successful to a large extent because people trust
the reputation information presented by them. In a completely decentralized envi-
ronment, such as a peer-to-peer network, however, there is no single, recognizable
organization or entity to maintain and distribute trust. As a result, trust infor-
mation must be itself securely distributed throughout the network, and hosted on
many diﬀerent nodes. Distributed trust management systems oﬀer mechanisms for
achieving this, by extending the architecture and functionality of the transacting
nodes.
1.2 Motivation and aims
MoR-Trust (stands for monetary-ratcheted trust) is is based on purely decen-
tralized peer-to-peer architectures and algorithms, and is targeted towards systems
focusing on collaborative tasks or transactions, and is based on the notion of mod-
elling and expressing trust in terms of a quantitative monetary units, thus coupling
trust estimates with transaction values. This is the main characteristic of MoR-
Trust as compared to other systems (see Section 2). This approach allows the
design of algorithms for the estimation, usage and propagation of trust estimates
throughout the network, reﬂecting the way in which trust and reputation are uti-
lized in real life communities. Central to our approach is the notion of ratcheting
trust estimates, i.e. allowing the build-up of trust as a result or repeated successful
transactions, potentially beyond the actual transaction value.
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2 Related Work
We concisely present below the main solutions that have been proposed for dis-
tributed trust and reputation management. They address either of both of the
following two problems (see also [3]):
(i) The data modelling (or semantic) problem: How to generate, interpret and
process the trust / reputation data; and
(ii) The data management (or system) problem: How to store, retrieve, distribute
and secure the trust / reputation data in a scalable and eﬃcient manner.
The EigenTrust system [18] performs a distributed computation of a single
network-wide reputation value for each peer, based the outcomes of past inter-
actions. Local trust values that result from interactions with other peers are ag-
gregated in such a way that the global trust values correspond to an eigenvector
of a matrix containing local (normalized) trust values. Security is provided by the
local trust values not being kept by the interested peers, but by other peers that are
selected in the network based on the properties of a structured underlying routing
mechanism. An extension of this approach to provide protection against collusion
is presented in [30].
The PeerTrust system [29] focuses heavily on the data modelling aspect, with
less emphasis on the data management side. A complex model for describing, in-
terpreting and combining a variety of diﬀerent trust metrics, based on feedback,
transaction frequency, credibility, and diﬀerent context factors is described. At the
data management level, each peer stores a small portion of the global trust data,
while trust manager peers are assigned to monitor and evaluate the trustworthiness
of other peers. A structured routing infrastructure provides the necessary means
of organizing the peers and their trust information distribution. The problem of
misbehaving peers is addressed by means of majority voting, data replication and
encryption.
The Credence system [28] is based on the notion of the reputation of data objects,
instead of nodes. It allows nodes to contribute evaluations of data objects, and it
also supports a network wide statistical correlation scheme between nodes, based
on whether the votes of nodes for the same objects generally agree or disagree, thus
forming a correlation matrix.
In [8], a distributed reputation system is designed based on a Bayesian approach.
Nodes maintain ﬁrst-hand reputation information which they regularly publish to
other peers. More global reputation values are thus built by the peers receiving
the local reputation scores. This work describes the mathematical model, however
does not elaborate particularly on the data management approach or the security
considerations.
The work in [3] is based on the P-Grid structured peer-to-peer routing algorithm
[2]. It adequately addresses both the semantic level (trust model) and the data
management level. Essentially the data management is taken care of by allowing a
set of agent peers to monitor and asses the behaviour of other peers, through the use
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of P-grid and the associations it creates between groups of peers. Each transaction is
monitored and the result registered. At the data modelling level, the trust reported
by a monitoring peer is weighted by the trust placed on the monitoring peer itself.
Trust and mistrust are represented in a rather limiting, binary fashion.
One of the main characteristics of the TrustMe system [22] is that it provides
anonymity. It uses a random assignment of Trust-holding Agent Peers and uses
public key mechanisms to prevent any loss of anonymity. The assignment is carried
out by a bootstrap server (note: an element of centralization). This work focuses
on the data management aspect of the problem, and does not elaborate much on
the trust model. Essentially any peer interacting with another one can ﬁle a report
with its Trust-holding agent regarding the interaction. The trust value for any peer
is a result of the cumulative value of all these reports.
The XRep protocol [11,10] essentially utilises a simple collection of votes based
on random polling of other peers that may or may not maintain local reputation
information for speciﬁc peers.
In [16] a partially centralized mechanism using reputation computation agents
and data encryption is described, in which the reputation values are calculated,
encrypted and stored locally using a reputation computation agent. They propose
two diﬀerent schemes for calculating reputation values: a credit / debit scheme and
a credit only scheme.
The Poblano system [9] is based on each peer maintaining a table with a con-
ﬁdence value placed on other peers. The conﬁdence value that peer A places for
peer B results from forming one or more paths from A to B, by following the table
entries of A and other peers between A and B. The results are combined according
to formulas describing the data model, and, in case of multiple paths, weighted
averages of the results of each path are used.
The authors of [20] present two alternative designs, one focusing on storage and
the other on network bandwidth as the resource of interest. The ﬁrst requires the
existence of a public key infrastructure and strong node identities, and is based on
digitally signed usage records and a series of auditing procedures. The latter does
not require such infrastructure, and uses the number of objects sent or received by
each node to produce ﬁgures for the debt or credit of the node, and the conﬁdence
that other nodes can have on this peer.
Finally an architectural approach to decentralized trust management, including
a brief threat analysis can be found in [25].
3 MoR-Trust System Design
Although our design is not limited within the domain of business or commercial
transactions, for the purposes of this work we adopt (and slightly adapt) the con-
cepts of Collaboration and Transaction, as deﬁned by the ebXML Business Process
Speciﬁcation Schema [26], to deﬁne the scope of our system:
Transaction: An atomic unit of work that can only involve two parties and can
result in either a success or a failure.
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Collaboration: A combination of choreographed Transactions that can involve any
number of parties and deﬁnes the ordering and transition between them.
This deﬁnition is wide and generic enough to encompass a broad range of appli-
cations, as individual transactions constitute the building blocks of more complex
collaborations. In the following sections we will be describing a trust management
system that focuses on the transaction level; any choreography, workﬂow or more
complex collaboration level built above it is considered transparent.
3.1 Trust model
Central to the system’s design is the representation of trust information. Mor-
Trust is designed to support transactions of a clear quantitative nature. Without
any loss of generality, the reader can imagine our system as supporting ﬁnancial
transactions, in which speciﬁc amounts of money are exchanged for goods or services.
Within this context we chose to use an orthogonal and practical way of expressing
trust information; namely in terms of the monetary value used for the transactions
themselves, as a continuous scalar value. In other words, if node na estimates a
trust value V for node nb, it means that node na should generally trust node nb
only for transactions whose value does not exceed V monetary units.
Based on this coupling between transaction value and trust estimate, we devise
a series of practical algorithms, described in the following sections, for combining
and estimating trust measures, deciding on whether to proceed with transactions
or not, updating trust estimates based on transaction values and outcomes, and
propagating trust information to other nodes.
The transaction outcome itself, for a transaction with monetary value V , can
be a number between 0 and V , denoting the degree to which the transaction was
successful in the view of the transacting nodes. Typically 0 and V will be the val-
ues most often encountered, corresponding to either failed or completely successful
transactions; however intermediate values are also possible, in cases of partially suc-
cessful transactions (e.g. goods delivered but with delay, speciﬁcations not entirely
met etc. etc.)
Our model further allows the build up of perceived trust values as a result of
repeated successful transactions. We describe our mechanism as ratcheted, since
it carries inherently a way of incrementing the trust value further than the actual
transaction value, based on the transaction outcome, as will be described in detail
in the following sections.
3.2 System and functional description
To incorporate Mor-Trust, the architecture of the network nodes is extended to
maintain a local trust store, in the form of a table associating node identiﬁers N
with estimated trust values tN for those nodes. This table will only maintain trust
information for a subset of the network (the node’s “trust neighbours”), and will
be dynamically updated as trust information is propagated from other nodes, or as
a result of transactions carried out. This trust store generates a separate overlay
network, independent of the underlying structured or unstructured peer to peer
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network.
The node’s functionality is also extended to perform ﬁve tasks with each trans-
action cycle:
1. Trust path generation. Due to the distributed nature of the system, it is
likely that the transaction initiating node will have no trust information for the
target node in its local store. There is therefore need for a mechanism to consult
other “intermediate” nodes, until some trust estimate is obtained for the target
node. Trust links, or paths, are in this way built between the nodes.
2. Trust estimation. Evaluating and combining trust data collected from other
nodes along paths to generate a local a-priori trust estimate for the target node.
3. Decision. According to the a-priori trust estimate, decide whether to engage
in the transaction or not.
4. Processing transaction outcome. Evaluating transaction outcome and
producing a new trust estimate for the target node.
5. Trust Propagation. Updating and propagating the trust estimates through-
out the network.
The following sections describe the above tasks in more detail.
3.3 Trust path generation
The general approaches to forming trust links between peers are the following [12]
(see also Figure 1):
“Web of trust” approach. Trust information is obtained by ﬁnding a path leading
from the initiating node to the target node, following links through the nodes’
local trust stores (an example is the Poblano system [9]).
“Statistical” approach. Involves obtaining trust information from many peers and
then forming a quorum (an example is the P-Grid system [2]). Such an approach
relies on an eﬃcient, decentralized storage infrastructure.
Hybrid approach. Consists of obtaining trust information through diﬀerent inde-
pendent paths, and then forming a weighted quorum dependent on the relative
conﬁdence placed on these paths.
Fig. 1. On the left two separate reputation paths are formed to join the initiating and target node. On
the right, three independent nodes hold trust information about the target node, and are interrogated by
the initiating node.
S. Androutsellis-Theotokis et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 179 (2007) 3–158
In our design we adopted the hybrid approach. The network is scanned based
on the local trust stores in a way that ensures that the paths created are indepen-
dent and non-intersecting. We experimented with diﬀerent approaches in the path
creation, including biased random walks in which the direction selected is biased by
the trust estimate placed for each intermediate node.
3.4 Trust estimation.
Assuming the nodes in a path P of length l are labelled n1, n2, ..., nl (where n1 is the
initiating node and nl is the target node), an overall path trust estimate TP (n1, nl)
for the target node is produced through the path, based on the following recursive
deﬁnition, where i < j and Tl(ni, nj) is the trust estimate locally maintained in the
trust store of node ni for node nj:
TP (ni, nj) = Tl(ni, nj), if nj > ni + 1(1)
Tl(ni, ni+1) ⊗ TP (ni+1, nj), otherwise.
In the above formula, the path is scanned from n1 to nl, and in each step the
local trust estimate for each successive node is recursively applied as a weight on
the estimate produced for the rest of the path, using function tw ⊗ te (denoting the
weighing of a trust estimate te proposed by a node N , by another trust estimate tw
for N), which is deﬁned as:
tw ⊗ te = te, if tw ≥ te(2)
tw · (2−
tw
te
), otherwise.
This function, plotted in Figure 2.a, states that if the weight tw placed on the
trust estimate te is greater than the trust estimate itself, then the trust estimate
is accepted as is. Otherwise, the trust estimate is reduced according to the trust
weight. The reduction follows a quadratic form, increasingly penalising estimates
for which the trust weight is comparatively lower.
A conﬁdence value CP is also created for each path P that considers the entire
path length, penalizing longer paths, as well as paths including nodes with trust
estimates particularly lower than the overall trust estimate it produces:
CP =
∑
j (max (TP (n1, nl)− Tl(nj, nj+1), 0))
2
length(P )
The estimates provided by the diﬀerent trust paths Pj are then combined,
weighted by their respective conﬁdence values Cj , to provide the initiating node
with an overall a-priori trust estimate T (ni, nt) for the target node:
T (n1, nl) =
∑
j
(
Cj ∗ TPj (n1, nl)∑
j Cj
)
3.5 Decision
Based on the a-priori trust estimate described above, the initiating node ni needs
to decide whether to proceed with the transaction with target node nt or abort.
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We allow some ﬂexibility by incorporating in each node ni a notion of a “risk
factor” rmi, expressed as a percentage where rmi > 1, so that the decision is:
Proceed if T (ni, nt) ≥ transaction value · rmi.
The risk factor can, for example, be increased as successful transactions are
accomplished and more conﬁdence is gained, however in the current implementation
it is maintained constant.
3.6 Processing transaction outcome.
If a node decides not to proceed with a transaction, this step is skipped, and the
node moves straight to the trust propagation stage.
The actual transaction process is beyond the scope of the trust algorithm, except
that a value denoting the degree of success of the transaction must be reported back
from the application to MoR-Trust. As described above, usually the value will
either be 0 for transaction failure, or equal to the transaction value V for success,
however all intermediate values are allowed.
The a-priori trust estimate te obtained before the transaction, is combined with
the transaction result r to produce a new trust estimate nt for the target node. In
our current implementation we examine the following options:
• Application of a formula similar to equation 2:
tn = te, if r ≥ te(3)
r · (2−
r
te
), otherwise.
In this way no increase in the perceived trust for the target peer is achieved
by the initiating peer in case of a successful transaction, no matter what the
transaction value was. In case of a not completely successful transaction the
reputation estimate is decreased accordingly.
• Application of the formula:
tn =
(
Va · r
te
)2
+ te, if transaction successful(4)
Vb ·
(
te −
t2e
r + te
)
, otherwise,
where Va and Vb are parameters used to ﬁne tune the algorithm performance
(see also Section 5).
This formula is plotted in Figure 2.b for diﬀerent values of Va and Vb. The
three lower curves correspond to unsuccessful transactions, while the three upper
curves to successful ones. It penalizes an unsuccessful transaction, however for
successful transactions whose result exceeds the a-priori trust estimate te it will
produce an increased new perceived trust. The suggested increase might seem
excessive for transaction results signiﬁcantly exceeding te, however it will only
occur in the event the initiating peer decides to engages in such a transaction,
which already suggests a perceived trust on its behalf that exceeds the generated
trust estimate.
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Fig. 2. (a) Function tw ⊗ te, for weighing a trust estimate te proposed by a node N , by another trust
estimate tw for N ; (b)The function combining an a-priori estimated trust value with a transaction result
to produce a new estimated trust value for the target node. The top three curves are used in case of
completely successful transactions, the three bottom curves if not. We show the curves for diﬀerent values
of the parameters Va and Vb.
3.7 Trust propagation
The way in which the new trust information is propagated to other nodes inﬂuences
the overall trust network convergence rate, but also the overall traﬃc, scalability
and node trust store size.
We experimented with the following options, based on formula 2, for weighing
a new trust estimate with the perceived trust of the node suggesting it:
(i) Only update the trust estimate of the initiating node.
(ii) Update trust estimates for all the nodes in the trust paths.
(iii) Update trust estimates for all the nodes the trust table of the initiating node.
It became apparent that propagating trust further than that would impose too
heavy a burden on the network traﬃc to be deemed acceptable. In Section 5 we
present results for option (i).
4 Simulation setting
The main elements of our simulation setting for experimenting with the various
options and parameters of our design are the following.
Network initialisation
Initialisation of the underlying peer-to-peer network structure, the node parame-
ters, and the trust overlay network, based on acceptable statistical distributions.
Both the underlying peer-to-peer network and the trust network, as described
through the local trust stores maintained in the various nodes, were generated
based on the NGCE [27] application, a tool for generating graphs based on various
parameterizable graph topologies including homogeneous, random, and scale-free.
Our networks were set up according to power-law distributions forming scale-
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free graphs, which are known to describe both the connectivity of the internet
and many other technical and social networks [7,15,17,19]. In [23] it was also
found, based on eBay transaction traces, that peer ranks also followed a power-
law distribution.
Additional node parameters, such as the node “honesty”, a scalar value that
drives its behaviour in transactions, and the risk factor, were based on standard
statistical distributions.
Network operation
Simulation of transactions is carried out based on average transaction rate per
node, and transaction parameters (transacting nodes, value etc.) selected based
on standard distributions. For each transaction event the process is carried out
as described in Section 3.2.
Trust management system and network status evaluation
The network trust status, and consequently the eﬀectiveness of the trust man-
agement system, can be evaluated based on diﬀerent metrics, such as:
(i) Average transaction satisfaction.
(ii) Correlation between average estimated trust values across network and actual
node fairness.
(iii) Correlation between initiated transaction values and target node fairness.
5 Simulation results
The MoR-Trust system was implemented in Java (the code will be made available
as an open source project).
The results presented here are preliminary, and further experimentations are
currently carried out to verify the system eﬀectiveness.
Fig. 3. Convergence of overall network correlation between trust estimates and real node honesty. The left
curve shows how parameter Va aﬀects correlation, the right curve parameter Vb.
Figure 3 shows the convergence of the overall network correlation between global
trust estimate and real node honesty values that guide the node behaviour in the
transactions. The two graphs show how the convergence is aﬀected by the param-
eters Va and Vb in formula 4. We note that an excessive increase in the value of
Va, which dictates the conﬁdence with which trust estimates will be increased be-
yond the transaction value as a result of a successful transaction, leads to poor
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convergence; too small a value with stall convergence.
Fig. 4. The oscillatory phase following initial convergence, for large numbers of transactions.
An interesting observation is also shown in ﬁgure 4, that shows the trust cor-
relation for a very large number of transactions. We observe that after an initial
period of convergence, the average trust estimate correlation enters an “oscillatory”
phase, in which the trust estimates move over and under the actual node honesty.
We believe that this is introduced by the ratcheting mechanism, which allows the
trust estimates to rise above successful transaction values. Though seemingly unde-
sirable, a similar behaviour is also observed in real data from on-line transactions,
where reputation that is built in one period of “honest” operation is then “milked”
in a subsequent period, thus leading to a similar oscillatory phase [13].
6 Discussion, conclusions and future work
MoR-Trust is based on the notion of expressing trust in terms of monetary units,
thus directly coupling the trust estimates circulated in the network with the values
of the transactions taking place and their outcomes.
Our design is ﬂexible in that it subdivides the trust management process in
separate modules and tasks, allowing the implementation of diﬀerent approaches
for each one.
We are currently in the process of enhancing our implementation, collecting and
analyzing more simulation results, and exploring the following research directions:
• Incorporation of security measures (conﬁdentiality, integrity, authentication). Ap-
proaches to this are already proposed in the literature (see [6] and references
therein) but in our initial implementation we have omitted them for reasons of
simplicity.
• Study of resource utilization (bandwidth, node storage, computational needs) as
a result of the diﬀerent variations of the proposed algorithms.
• Implementation of the trust management system on top of more robust, DHT-
based peer-to-peer routing systems, such as CHORD [24] or PeerTrust [29].
• Evaluation of alternative algorithms based on disciplines related to sociology game
theory, etc.
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• Performing an in-depth risk analysis to determine the system’s viability and sta-
bility in the face of security attacks by a number of malicious nodes.
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